The floor of rights in European labour law by Deakin, Simon
New Zealand journal of industrial relations, 1990, 15, 219-240 
• 
The floor of rights in European labour law 
Simon Deakin* 
Most European countries have legislated to provide a basic floor of rights which 
underpins collective bargaining. This article reviews the experiences of the major 
European countries and examines the way that the floor of rights is being extended. 
It also discusses the floor of rights in the context of the search for labour market 
flexibility. 
1. Introduction 
The concept of the floor of rights within labour law has a specific meaning: namely, 
the provision by legislation of minimum standards for the contract of employment, as a 
"floor" or base upon which collective bargaining is meant to build (Wedderburn, 1986). 
The content of the floor of rights consists, frrst of all, of laws laying down certain basic 
terms and conditions: in particular, maximum working hours, minimum wages and 
health and safety standards. Secondly, there are laws concerning the suspension and 
termination of the contract of employment itself: laws governing sickness and lay-off, the 
regular payment of wages, unjust or "unfair" dismissal, redundancy and also 
unemployment benefits. Thirdly, the law may provide specific or additional protections 
for certain groups of workers, with the aim of eliminating socially undesirable 
discrimination: in this category we may classify laws protecting union members and 
officials from dismissal, protecting pregnant workers and outlawing discrimination based 
upon, amongst other things, sex, race, nationality or disability. 
At the Strasbourg summit of 8-9 December 1989, a dec!aration of the basic social 
and employment rights of workers was adopted by 11 out of the 12 ntember states of the 
European Community (EC). This new "Social Charter" - more properly known as the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers - represents a 
commitment in broad terms to the achievement of basic social standards within the single 
European market after 1992. The commitment to a legal floor of rights to terms and 
conditions of employment is characteristic of the development of European labour law 
since 1945. Notwithstanding the impact of I 0 years of so of policies of deregulation and 
"flexibilisation" in the area of labour and social law, 2 features above all distinguish the 
national systems of western Europe: the use of the law to entrench a high level of 
minimum standards in the employment relationship; and the continuing role of collective 
bargaining as a mechanism for building on these legal minimum rights, a role which in 
many ways has become more and not less important with the need to introduce a greater 
degree of flexibility into the fonn and application of legal standards. 
Arguments for deregulation or de-lcgalisation have not gone unheeded within the 
Community, and there is a general recognition of the need to adopt measures which will 
assist in the reduction of unemployment or will, at least, avoid the imposition of 
excessive employment costs upon employers, in particular smaller firms. These 
arguments have been advanced furthest as a basis for policy in the United Kingdom, 
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which declined to join the other Community states in endorsing the Social Charter and 
continues to resist, as far as possible, the goal of a general harmonisation of social rights 
within the single market. The British Government argues that the most effective fonn of 
"social progress" is the growth in jobs and economic opportunities which it ascribes to 
the policy of deregulation. This can hardly be reconciled to the principles contained in 
the new Charter or, for that matter, to general principles of international labour law. 
However, it is possible that without effective implementation of high social 
standards throughout the Community, a form of "creeping deregulation" will take place 
once national barriers to the movement of labour and capital are removed and a 
"transparent" single market puts pressure on states to attract capital and resources by 
cutting employers' fiscal and legal costs. Under these conditions, "firms are able to 
escape, or threaten to escape, statutory or collectively agreed social protection by 
relocating their operations within the increasingly Europeanised economy" (Mosley, 
1990). To counter this trend there is a powerful argument in terms of both equity and 
efficiency for the entrenchment of social and labour standards at a high level within the 
single market (Muckenberger and Deakin, 1989). 
2. The social dimension to the European single market 
Social policy did not feature highly among the original aims of the founders of the 
EC (Hepple, 1987). The 1957 Treaty of Rome made provision for the adoption of 
Community Directives (which are in effect instructions to member states to introduce 
national legislation on particular matters) and Regulations (which are directly applicable 
in national law) in the area of social policy as part of the general aim of implementing 
the common market, and made reference to the desirability of social harmonisation and 
the upwards improvement of social standards. Until the early 1970s, however, there was 
no systematic programme of social harmonisation at Community level. In part, this was 
because of a view which held that the gradual implementation of the "common market" 
would see a convergence in social standards around the best features of the various 
national systems without the need for specific legislative direction from the centre. 
This situation changed in the 1970s as a result of 2 parallel developments. The first 
was the adoption of a Social Action Programme to coincide with the expansion of the 
Community beyond the original 6 members in the early 1970s. This led to agreement by 
the member states on a number of Directives in the field of social and employment law, 1 
concerned on the one hand with protection the position of employees affected by 
economic restructuring (as in the case of the Directives on Collccti ve Redundancies 
(1975), Acquired Rights on Company Transfers (1977) and Employer Insolvency (1980)) 
and on the other with the achievement of equal treatment for women in employment and 
social security (most notably the Directives of 1975 on Equal Pay, 1976 on Equal 
Treatment in Employment, 1979 on Equal Treatment in Social Security and 1986 on 
Equal Treatment in Occupational Social Security). 
The second parallel development was the application by the European Court of 
Justice of the legal doctrine of "direct effect" to certain of the social law provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome and to the Directives of the 1970s, as a means of granting individuals 
rights which were enforceable in national courts even in the absence of effective domestic 
1 Under the constitutional rules of the European Community, Directives and Regulations are 
prepared and formulated by the European Commission, which is the bureaucratic and 
administrative arm of the Community, sometimes in consultation with the European 
Parliament. These measures are then put to a vote of representatives of the member states 
sitting in the European Council. 
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legislation. 2 The assertion of the supremacy of Community law in the area of equal 
treatment has had widespread repercussions in national law systems for equality of pay, 
equal employment rights and the treatment of female part time workers. This process is 
still continuing today. 
For most of the 1980s, however, progress on the legislative front was held up at 
least formally by the opposition of the Thatcher administration in Britain to new 
initiatives for Directives in the social field. Under the constitutional arrangements in 
force during this period, the adoption of such Directives required the unanimous support 
of the national governments, so giving the Thatcher government an effective veto over 
these proposals. 
The Single European Act of 1986 made a series of amendments to the Treaty of 
Rome which aimed to speed up the process of economic integration by making greater 
provision for majority voting on proposals for Community-wide legislation. At the 
same time the European Commission, which is responsible amongst other things for the 
preparation of Community legislation, launched a programme of institutional reforms 
designed to achieve a "single market" by the end of 1992. The aim of a "European social 
area" was part of this programme. However, while the Single European Act introduced 
the possibility of "qualified majority" voting over a wide range of issues designed to 
implement the 1992 project, it also made a number of exceptions, most notably in the 
areas of taxation, the free movement of persons and the rights of employees. The one 
area of social policy where qualified majority voting was clearly permitted was the area of 
the "working environment" and specifically occupational health and safety. Accordingly, 
in June 1989 the national governments gave their approval to a range of Directives 
concerning health and safety which seck to generalise some of the best elements of 
national practice (Eberlie, 1990). 
The adoption of the Social Charter did not create any new legally-binding obligations 
upon member states as it is only a "solemn declaration of fundamental social rights at 
Community level". It remained for the Commission to propose, in its Action 
Programme of November 1989, a series of new Directives which will implement the 
general principles of the Charter. Together the Charter and the Action Programme 
represent a significant commitment to the generalisation of social standards in the areas of 
both individual and collective labour law rights. There are general references in the 
Charter to the need to ensure minimum levels of working and living conditions, fair 
remuneration, social protection, equality of treatment and special protections for 
vulnerable groups in the labour market (the young, the old and the disabled). The 
maintenance of health and safety, the provision of adequate training and freedom of 
movement are matters which receive more specific attention. At the collective level there 
arc references to freedom of association and to the right to strike, although there is a great 
deal of doubt about the precise tcnns of these provisions. 3 
The Commission's Action Programme contains a number of more specific proposals 
for legislation. However the draft Directives and Regulations still require the approval of 
lhe member states before they are to become legally operative. In some areas it is clear 
that a qualified majority in the European Council - which consists of the representatives 
2 Regulations are "directly applicable" in national law, which means that they may be 
applied without the need for additional national legislation. Directives, on the other 
hand, presuppose some kind of implementing measure by the member states. This 
distinction has however been blurred by the doctrine of "direct effect", under which certain 
rights contained in Directives may be applied against national governments even if they 
have failed to introduce the necessary legislation. Certain rights contained in the Treaty 
of Rome itself - such as the right to equal pay contained in Article 119 - are directly 
effective between private citizens and so may affect the employment relationship itself. 
See Wyatt (1989). 
3 See Wedderburn ( 1990) for a fuller account of the Treaty and Action Programme. 
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of the national governments - will suffice. This was the case for the health and safety 
Directives of 1989, although in the result there were no dissenters. 
The Commission has recently put forward draft Directives in the areas of atypical 
employment and working time, and here the legal position is more unclear (Vogel-
Polsky, 1990). The issue is important as the British government will exercise its veto to 
block these proposals unless they can be voted through on a qualified majority which 
would override British opposition. There are 3 proposed Directives on atypical 
employment which seek, in general tenns, to ensure parity of treatment of part time and 
temporary workers with full time employees. One of them will require unanimity from 
the member states as it is put forward under powers which pre-date the Single European 
Act, while another is concerned with occupational health and safety and so may in 
principle may be voted through on a qualified majority as explained above. The third and 
most controversial proposal has been put forward under the general power to use qualified 
majority voting to implement the single market, even though it would appear to relate to 
the the rights of employees and so should require unanimity. However, the Commission 
has argued that the existence of different regulations concerning atypical work in the 
member states creates potential distortions of competition, and that this, rather than the 
protection of employees' rights as such, is the basis for the proposed harmonisation. The 
draft Directive on working time has been put forward under the heading of occupational 
health and safety on the assumption that it will only require a qualified majority. There 
is some doubt as to whether this issue can legitimately considered as a health and safety 
question. 
The prospects for a more complete implementation of the Action Programme depend 
to a large degree on the Commission's success with these early proposals, and this no 
doubt accounts for the cautious approach which the Commission has adopted up until 
now. The Commission needs Lo obtain general support among the member states for a 
programme of legislative refonn and there is already concern that vital issues have been 
watered down, or deferred, in order to gain such a consensus. The draft Directives on 
atypical work, for example, appear to be much less rigorous than earlier attempts to 
propose Community-wide legislation in this area, and any early progress on general 
standards for the minimum wage has been ruled out. None of this, however, precludes 
more extensive harmonisation at a later stage. 
3. Minimum statutory employment standards in national 
legislation 
Hours and wages 
Controls over the length of the working week were among the first to be established 
on a comprehensive basis in western Europe, after the fust World War (Vogel-Polsky, 
1986; Blanpain, 1988). In France, legislation established the 8 hour working day in 
1919 and a 40 hour week in 1936. This legislation was re-established in 1946. Further 
legislation in 1982 established a basic norm of 39 hours per week, but with provisions 
for flexibility to be achieved through plant-level collective bargaining (this is discussed 
further below). Overtime is also regulated: weekly hours must not exceed 48 in total, or 
an average of 46 per week over a 12 week cycle. These limits can be exceeded only with 
the authorisation of the labour inspectorate. 
In West Gennany the basic law governing working time dates back to 1938, when an 
8 hour day and 48 hour week were established. This has since been lowered by collective 
bargaining, so that a 40 hour standard was nearly universal by the late 1970s. Since then 
there have been further reductions in basic hours in particular in the engineering industry, 
which established a general 38.5 hour working week by agreement in 1984. A further 
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:~grccment in the engineering sector in 1987 made provision for a reduction in the basic 
working week to an average of 37.5 hours by April 1988 and 37 hours by April 1989. In 
law, overtime is pcnnittcd up to 2 hours per day and 10 hours on 30 days in any one 
year; for this purpose however the benchmark is the 48 hour week which remains the 
legislative standard. In practice collective bargaining regulates overtime above the current 
conventional limits. 
Table 1: Working time regulations in the European Community, 1987 
Working week 
(hours) 
Country By law By agreement 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
40 
39 
39 
41 
48 
48 
40 
48 
48 
40 
West Germany 4 8 
United Kingdom 
37 to 40 
37.5 to 40 
35 to 39 
35 to 40 
35 to 40 
36 to 40 
37 to 40 
36 to 40 
34 to 48 
37 to40 
37.5 to40 
35 to 40 
Source: Trade Union Congress (1988). 
Actual hours worked 
(full-time employees 
average weekly hours 
including overtime) 
Male Female 
39.2 38.3 
3 9.1 37.0 
40.9 3 8. 6 
39.7 3 7. 7 
42.0 38.6 
39.6 36.4 
40.3 38.4 
40.9 38.6 
42.0 39.0 
41.7 40.4 
42.4 37.2 
Notes: a Spanish figures include part time work. 
Annual leave 
By law By agreement 
4 weeks 4-5 weeks 
5 weeks 
5 weeks 5-6 weeks 
4 weeks As by law 
3 weeks 4 weeks 
4-6 weeks 
5 weeks 25-29 days 
3 weeks 4-5 weeks 
30 civil days 4.5-5 weeks 
30 civil days 4.5-5 weeks 
3 weeks 5.5-6 weeks 
4-6 weeks 
This pattern is repeated in a number of other European countries, in which legislative 
standards have been outstripped by sector-level collective agreements (sec Table 1). In 
Denmark, there is no statutory regulation but sector-level agreements backed by law set a 
39 hour week for blue collar workers and an average 37.5-38 hour week for white collar 
workers. Other countries setting a shorter working week for white collar workers are 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Britain. Legislation and collective agreements in most 
European countries also regulate shift working, nightwork and weekend breaks. Sunday 
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work is strictly regulated in most countries and there are specific constraints upon 
nightwork in blue collar occupations by women and young workers. In a number of 
systems these restrictions may be modified by plant-level collective bargaining (sec 
below). 
The provision of paid holidays is governed by legislation in nearly all countries. In 
France, Spain, Sweden and Denmark, for example, legislation sets a high standard of 5 
weeks' paid leave per year. In Germany, on the other hand, legislation of 1953 sets only 
3 weeks' annual paid leave and improvements since then have been brought about by 
collective bargaining, which has established up to 6 weeks or 30 days paid leave in the 
engineering and chemical sectors. In Italy there is no legislative provision beyond the 
broad terrns of Article 36 of the national Constitution, but collective agreements set a 
general standard of 4 weeks' paid leave for all employees after one year of service. In 
most countries these provisions for paid annual holidays are in addition to legislation and 
agreements which set aside certain days as paid public holidays. 
Legislation and, in some systems, collective agreements regulate in more detail the 
calculation of holiday pay and bonuses. In West Germany, for example, most collective 
agreements provide for employees to receive holiday bonuses over and above the basic 
rate of pay for the days of holiday and an annual bonus, so creating an extra salary for the 
"thirteenth month" (European industrial relations review, 1987). 
The major exception to the pattern of statutory regulation of the basic working week 
is Britain, where there are no general legislative standards on the duration of the working 
week and no legislation on either public holidays or paid annual leave. The last 
remaining selective hours regulations, dating from the 1930s, which set a basic 48 hour 
week for women and young workers in factory employment, were repealed in 1986 and 
1989 as part of the policy of deregulation (Deakin, 1990). In low paying trades with 
statutory wages councils, whose orders are legally binding, a 39 hour week is generally 
recognised. 
In the absence of legislation, sector level collective agreements in Britain have 
achieved a general lowering of daily and weekly hours since the 1920s when a basic 6 day 
week of 48 hours was fust established in the engineering sector. The basic week for 
manual workers in the engineering sector was gradually reduced from 44 hours 
immeiliately after World War Two to 39 hours and a 5 day week in the early 1980s. This 
standard was generally adopted in all sectors during the 1980s. White-collar workers have 
traditionally enjoyed a shorter working week than the manual grades covered in national 
agreements; a 3 7.5 hour week is now the general norm for them. 
Even if sector-level agreements in Britain have performed some of the functions of 
legislation in other countries, a principal substantive difference between Britain and other 
western European systems is the extent of overtime working. British collective 
agreements do not, on the whole, seek to limit actual overtime hours; they arc confined 
to setting overtime premium rates. This is one reason why overtime working in 
manufacturing is far more extensive in Britain than elsewhere in Europe. There is also a 
considerable degree of variation across sectors in the length of the working week in 
Britain once overtime is taken into account, with employees in some sectors working 
very long weekly hours (Rubery et al., 1990). 
Holiday entitlements in Britain are also regulated by sector-level collective 
agreements, with a gradual trend during the 1980s building on the 4 weeks standard. 
Around one fifth of blue collar employees arc now covered by agreements providing for 5 
weeks' paid holidays; for white collar employees, 4 to 5 weeks is the norm with the 
possibility of service-related increments to this basic entitlement (Rubcry eta/., 1990). 
All systems have some form of minimum wage regulation, but they differ in the 
type of legal mechanisms used, in terms of the workers covered and in the level of the 
minimum in relation to average prices and wages (Minford, 1989). In France the 
statutory minimum wage or SMIC (salaire minimum interprofessionel de croissance ) is 
index-linked to both price and wage increases. This specific linkage was the purpose 
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behind the introduction of the SMIC in 1970, replacing an earlier law of 1950. Every 2 
percent rise in the consumer price index triggers a rise in the minimum wage, in addition 
to which there is provision for a yearly review which must ensure that the annual growth 
of the minimum wage is not less than 50 percent of the growth in the purchasing power 
of the average wage. Other countries with a statutory minimum are the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal. In the Netherlands there is provision for twice yearly 
wage increases to keep the statutory minimum in line with the index of wages, although 
the normal procedures were frozen in 1983 and some cuts in the statutory minimum were 
imposed after that. In Portugal there are annual government reviews but there is no legal 
guarantee of index linking nor of any automatic yearly increase. The annual review uses 
forecasts of future price and wage rises rather than historical wage growth, and this can 
result in under-estimates of the effect of price inflation. In Spain, yearly increases are 
again based on the projected rate of price inflation, but there is provision for further 
increases at 6 month intervals if the official estimate proves to be too low. 
A number of systems seek to achieve comprehensive coverage through the collective 
bargaining system. In Belgium, a national level collective agreement is concluded 
annually by representatives of trade unions and employers' associations, as part of which 
the minimum wage is linked to rises in the consumer prices index. The national 
minimum only applies in the absence of an industry-level collective agreement for the 
work in question, and in practice most sectors are covered by such agreements. National 
level collective bargaining on the minimum wage, supported by the force of law, also 
operates in Greece. 
In West Germany and Denmark, by contrast, basic minima are supplied by sector-
level collective agreements, whose terms are generally binding in law (see below). It is 
estimated that approximately 90 percent of the West German labour force is covered by 
industry-wide agreements, which set wage rates which arc the subject of annual re-
negotiations. Legislative provisions exist for the extension of minimum terms and 
conditions of employment to non-union firms, and for the application of minimum rates 
in collective agreements to sectors where effective bargaining does not exist In Denmark 
there is a dual minimum wage system, with some sectors operating a low "minimum 
wage" which sets a base for bargaining over additional rates at company level, and others 
operating a more effective sector-level minimum known as the "standard" wage. 
Collective agreements cover between 80 and 85 percent of the workfofce. There has been 
no automatic indexation since 1983 and from 1985-86 government measures have 
imposed limits on annual wage increases. 
A similar effect operates in Italy as the result of an activist judicial interpretation of 
Article 36 of the national Constitution which guarantees each worker the right to a "fair 
wage" in proportion to his or her own work and to their family's consumption needs. 
Agreements for lower wages are void and the courts will apply instead the minimum 
wage derived from the relevant national collective agreement. However, the coverage of 
this system is limited within the extensive small finn sector and the legal remedies 
available arc not as effective as the "extension" legislation which operates in France and 
Gennany, as it is up to the individual to bring any claim. As a result there has been a 
considerable debate within recent years about the merits of introducing a more 
comprehensive statutory minimum wage. In addition to the minimum contractual pay 
laid down by collective agreements, automatic cost-of-Hving increases take effect annually 
through the scala mobile which has statutory force. 
At the other extreme of minimum wage regulation are the British and Irish systems, 
where statutory regulation of minimum pay and conditions is confined to certain low-
paying trades. Regulation takes the form of tripartite bodies which are in effect statutory 
substitutes for collective bargaining - in Britain the Wages Councils, covering about 2.5 
million workers or 9 percent of the employed labour force, and in Ireland the Joint Labour 
Committees which cover 30,000 workers or about 2 percent of the workforce. Terms and 
conditions in wages orders arc legally binding on all employers within the scope of the 
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relevant sector, but there is no legal requirement for these minimum wage rates to keep 
pace with average prices or with wages. In Britain the Wages Act 1986 limited Wages 
Councils to setting single pay rates for each sector, and made a number of other changes 
which have limited the impact of this fonn of regulation (see below). National level 
agreements outside the statutory sectors also play an important role in setting minimum 
wage rates, but in the common law systems these collective agreements do not have an 
automatic legal effect and so will not normally be binding on non-union firms. 
Furthennore, unlike in West Germany or Denmark where the coverage of sector level 
bargaining is comprehensive, there are significant sectors in Britain without effective 
national level bargaining, such as retail and distribution and large parts of private 
. 
services. 
The rates at which minimum wages are set in relation to average wages vary greatly, 
as do the rates between different countries even within the EC. Table 2 gives indications 
of the minimum wage in each of the EC countries, calculated as a percentage of the 
average wage in each system. The figures range from around 70 percent and over in 
France, Greece, West Germany, Denmark and Portugal, to 50 percent or less in Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. Another comparative indicator is the conversion of the 
minimum rates into £sterling at the purchasing power parity exchange rate which makes 
it possible to compare the consumption level provided by the minimum wages. 
According to calculations carried out by Mark Minford for the Low Pay Unit in 1989, the 
minimum rate set by the Wages Councils in the UK is barely half that set by collective 
agreements in West Germany, and more on a level with those of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal (Table 2). 
Numbers directly dependent upon the minimum wage also vary between countries, 
and within countries there are variations according to sector and firm size. Employees in 
smaller firms and in non-industrial sectors tend to be more heavily dependent on the 
minimum wage as an absolute floor to wages. France has one of the smaller percentages 
of workers who receive pay which is at the level of the minimum wage - in 1985 this 
was estimated to be 7.3 percent of employees in fmns with 10 workers or more, and 16 
percent of those in smaller companies (European industrial relations review, 1986). In 
the Netherlands, the figure was 7 percent for all employees, in Spain, 10 percent and in 
Portugal nearer 20 percent. 
The age poir.t at which the full minimum wage becomes payable varies from 18 in 
France, Spain and Greece to 20 in Portugal, 21 in Belgium and 23 in the Netherlands. In 
each case, young employees receive a graduated percentage of the full adult rate. In 
Denmark, West Germany and Italy, collective agreements generally provide for workers 
over the age of 18 to receive the full adult rate, but this is subject to the fulfilment of 
necessary training qualifications. 
Legal enforcement of collective agreements 
The nature of legal support for collective agreements is in its way just as important 
as statutory provisions laying down minimum terms and conditions which apply to all 
employees. Firstly this is because even in systems with a high degree of statutory 
intervention some matters are left up to sector-level collective bargaining, such as the 
minimum wage in West Germany. Secondly, in all systems legal intervention plays an 
important role in stabilising collective agreements, by requiring employers, in some 
circumstances, to recognise representati vc unions and to bargain with them, and to 
observe the tenns of the agreements to which they are parties. Thirdly, the law may 
extend the effect of collective agreements beyond the immediate parties by imposing the 
minimum tenns of sector-level agreements on under-organised employers and sectors 
(Wedderburn and Sciarra, 1988). 
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Table 2: Minimum wages by law and collective agreement in the European 
Community. 1989 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
ILaly 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
West Germany 
UK 
Qualifying 
age 
Adult rate 
(per month) 
21.5 
18 
18 
18 
20 
18 
23 
20 
18 
18 
21 
BFr 35250 
Kr 10000 
FF 4962 
Dr 55595 
£Ir 429 .95-535.05b 
BFr 31029 (blue collar) 
37235 (white collar) 
Fl 1987.70 
Esc. 28400 (agricultural) 
30000 (industrial) 
Pta 46680 
DM 2489 
£S tg33 8-422.5 oc 
Source: Minford (1989). 
In £S tg at PPP 
exchange rate1 
£ 
495.50 
565.00 
410.75 
278.50 
349.00-
435.00 
498.62 
598.35 
528.65 
180.65 
190.85 
274.50 
653.25 
338-
422.50 
Minimum as percentage 
of average wage 
64.6 (blue collar) 
4 6.3 (white collar)d 
69.4 
71.8 
70.4 
50.2 -62.4 
(range of awards) 
61.8 (blue collar) 
7 4.2 (white collar) 
71.4 
65.9 (agricultural) 
69.6 (industrial) 
43.1 (blue collar)d 
29.5 (white collar) 
69.3 (blue collar)d 
45.3 (white collar) 
41.7-52.1 (blue collar)d 
32.4-40.5 (white collar) 
(range of awards) 
Notes: a PPP: Purchasing power parity exchange rate, refers lD exchange rate after 
adjusting for relative price levels. Calculated by Minford (1989). 
b Refers to the range of awards made by Joint Labour Councils . 
c Refers to the range of awards made by Wages Councils. 
d Refers to the minimum wage expressed as a percentage of the average blue 
collar wage and white collar wage respectively. 
In most of the continental European systems, specific legislation provides for the 
incorporation of terms from collective agreements into individual contracts of 
employment. In West Gennany, the effect of the Collective Agreements Act 1949 (as 
amended in 1969) is broadly to give the nonnative tenns of sector collective agreements 
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the force of statutory regulation within the scope of their coverage, which may be 
national or regional within a particular industry. Thus terms and conditions arc 
automatically and compulsorily implied into the contracts of employment of union 
members; in practice, although not as a matter of law, employers accord the same 
benefits to non-unionists working alongside union members. Extension of collective 
agreements is achieved by a "declaration of general bindingness" issued by the Ministry of 
Labour at either state or federal level. Improvement on the tenns of sectoral agreements 
may take place at plant level. The relationship between sector-level and plant-level 
bargaining is partially determined by the tenns of the relevant sector-level agreement and 
partly by the scope of the statutory participation rights of the Works Councils at plant 
level. 
In France, section 132-4 of the Labour Ccxle lays down the principle that collective 
agreements may always improve on the minimum terms laid down in laws and 
regulations. By section 135-2, terms of collective agreements to which the employer is a 
party become automatically and compulsorily binding, although they may be improved 
on by individual bargaining. Extension of collective agreements, within a sector, and the 
"enlargement" of agreements to cover fums outside the sector itself, may be effected by 
order. In order to qualify for extension, collective agreements must have a minimum 
nonnative content. In particular, they must set out minimum wage rates for all relevant 
grades of employee and employers must enter into negotiations on a yearly basis on the 
minimum wage at sector and plant level. 
We already noted that in Britain collective agreements do not generally have the force 
of law which they arc accorded in the civilian systems. As an aspect of legal 
"abstentionism" in the area of collective labour relations, collective agreements between 
untons and employers arc presumed by statute not to be legally enforceable as contracts, 
unless the parties stipulate otherwise by a provision in writing. There is no legislation 
outside the Wages Councils sector to govern the incorporation of normative terms, but at 
common law such incorporation will generally be implied, in a case where it is not 
expressed as a term of the contract, if in practice the terms of agreements are regularly 
observed at plant or company level. If an employer either recognises a trade union for 
collective bargaining purposes, or applies the terms of sector-level agreements regardless 
of rccognillon. then the nonnallve terms will generally apply as a matter of law to 
unionists and non-unton members within the plant. This is as much a matter of 
convenience to the employer as a form of protection for the workers. There is no 
provision for the extension of collccttve agreements to cover non-unioniscd firms, nor is 
there any form of statutory obligation upon employers actually to recognise trade unions 
or to bargain with them. In practice sector-level bargaining is far from comprehensive 
across the economy as a whole, and its value is increasingly being undermined by more 
effective plant level bargaining, which however tends to be confined to larger and more 
5liongly-unioniscd establishments. 
Security of employment 
Historically, the movement of regulation in the area of dismissal lay first of all in the 
imposition of rninimum periods of notice, with greater protection for white collar and 
managerial crnployces, and in requiring special justification for sumn1ary dismissals 
(Vogel-Polsky, 1986). In the post war period, the requirement of "good cause" as a pre-
condition of termination of employment has become generally observed. This process 
was given considerable impetus by ILO Recommendation 119 of 1963, although son1e 
countries had already adopted forms of dismissal regulation by that time. National 
systen1s generally distinguish between personal disn1issals, on the one hand, and 
cconomtc or collccuvc dtsmissals, "redundancies", on the other. ~1ost systems adopt 
Table 3: Dismissal laws in selected European Community countries 
Country 
France 
Italy 
West 
Germany 
UK 
Notice periods 
1 to 2 months depending 
on length of service 
( 6 months minimum); 
custom and practice 
(less than 6 months) 
· · Determined by custom 
and practice or 
collective agreement. 
Blue collar workers: from 2 
weeks to 3 months; white 
collar workers: from 1 to 6 
months; in each case 
depending on seniority. 
Inferior protection for blue 
collar workers declared un-
constitutional by the courts 
From 1 to 12 weeks 
depending on length of 
service (minimum 4 weeks). 
Individual dismissals 
Sununary dismissal for gross misconduct. Dismissal 
with notice for just cause, with severance pay based on 
seniority. Employee with 2 years' service may appeal 
to the labour tribunal which may award reinstatement or 
compensation for unfair dismissal. 
Sununary dismissal for just cause. Employee (unless 
dismissed during period of probation) may appeal to 
labour judge who may order reinstatement, continued 
payment of wages or compensation for unfair 
dismissal. Automatic right to severance pay based on 
seniority in all cases of dismissal. 
Dismissal without notice for serious misconduct or in 
case of employees with less than 6 months' service. 
Dismissal with notice for misconduct,WlSuitability, 
breach of contract No automatic right to severance 
pay. Employee may claim unfair dismissal before 
labour court which may award compensation, or 
reinstatement if works council objects to dismissal. 
Summary dismissal for gross misconduct or serious 
breach of contract. Dismissal with notice for 
incompetence, misconduct, unsuitability or "other 
substantial reason". Employee with 2 years' service 
may claim unfair dismissal before industrial tribunal 
which may award reinstatement or compensation. 
Redundancies 
Individual redundancies permitted on economic grounds. 
Severance pay based on seniority. Legal obligation 
to consult and inform workplace representatives in case 
of collective redundancies. 
Individual redundancies are subject to general law of 
dismissal. Collective redundancies regulated by national 
collective agreement of 1965. Employer may apply for 
short-time working compensation from the Integration 
Fund (Cassa lntegrazione Gaudagni). 
Individual dismissals governed by general law of dismissal. 
No legal provision for redundancy pay as such but extensive 
provision in collective agreements. Legal requirement to 
consult and inform works councils in case of collective 
redundancies. 
Individual redundancies permitted on economic grounds. 
Individual right to redundancy compensation for 
employees with 2 years' service. Legal requirement to 
consult and inform recognised unions in case of collective 
redundancies. 
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qualifying thresholds of some kind which limit the scope of protection to regular 
employees with a period of continuous service. 
Minimum notice periods correlated to length of service are a general feature of the 
European systems. In West Germany they are based on legislation of 1926 which 
amended section 622 of the Civil Code. White collar workers are entitled to a minimum 
of 1 month or 6 weeks' notice in some cases, rising to 3 months with 5 years' service 
above the age of 25, 4 months with 8 years, 5 months with 10 years and 6 months with 
12 years. Blue collar workers receive a minimum of 2 weeks' notice, rising to 1 month 
after 5 years, 2 months after 10 years and 3 months after 20. These service qualifications 
refer to years after the age of 35; in 1986 the Federal Constitutional Court declared this 
provision unconstitutional in so far as it differentiated blue collar from white collar 
workers. In France and Britain legislation makes no formal distinction between white 
collar and blue collar workers, and lays down notice periods ranging from a few weeks, in 
Britain, to between 2 and 3 months at most for workers with more than 2 years' service. 
Collective agreements and workplace customs provide for longer periods. In Italy there is 
no legislation governing notice periods as such which are governed by collective 
agreements and workplace custom. 
The West German Dismissal Protection Acts of 1951 and 1969 require dismissal to 
be "socially justified" on the grounds of an individual's conduct or lack of capacity for the 
job. Similarly, in France the Labour Code permits dismissal with notice for reasons of 
just cause (cause reel/e et serieuse), which include incompetence and illness, and summary 
dismissal for faute lourde andfaute grave, in which case the employee may also lose 
rights to severance pay and holiday pay. In Italy the notion of a "justified motive" dates 
from legislation of 1966. 
An important element in each of these systems is the imposition of detailed 
procedural preconditions for dismissal, with the possibility of appeal to an independent 
labour court with the power in some instances to order the continuation of the contract of 
employment and the reinstatement of the employee. In Germany, the works council has 
the right to object to a dismissal, in which case the contract of employment remains in 
force until the maller is resolved by the labour court, unless the employer succeeds in 
getting an exemption order from the court. Employees who are not kept in employment 
may still be reinstated if the labour court finds that they were unjustly dismissed, 
although this happens only in a very small percentage of cases. The normal remedy 
would then be compensation, which consists of one month's salary for each year of 
service, and a higher rate for more senior employees. In France, a worker who has been 
unfairly dismissed may appeal to the labour tribunal which has the power to order 
reinstatement if the worker has more than 2 years' service, and is employed in a firm 
employing more than 10 workers. Reinstatement is also dependent on the agreement of 
both sides. Otherwise compensation representing up to 6 months' wages may be ordered. 
Employees may also be entitled to severance and holiday pay, either under the legislation 
or under the superior terms of collective agreements. 
The most stringent procedure, at least in terms of direct legal control is that laid 
down in Article 18 of the I tali an Workers Statute of 1970. Appeals are heard by the 
labour court judge sitting in the civil court. An unfair dismissal renders the termination 
of the contract "void", in which case the employer has the choice of either accepting 
reinstatement or continuing to pay the worker his contractual wages. In practice, not all 
cases of dismissal will come under the 1970 Act, which is limited to firms of a certain 
size, and there arc also difficulties of interpreting this provision in the light of earlier 
legislation, not formally repealed, which laid down the remedy of compensation up to a 
maximum of 12 months as the alternative to reinstatement. 
Unfair dismissal legislation was introduced in Britain in 1971. Although employers 
are required to show that the reason for the dismissal is potentially fair within the 
categories laid down in the legislation, in practice this is not difficult and much of the 
emphasis in the case law lies on the fairness or otherwise of the employer's procedure. 
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Complaints of unfair dismissal are made before an industrial tribunal. Reinstatement is 
the principal remedy at the tribunal's disposal, but there is no provision for the contract 
of employment to be kept in force during litigation and, once again, very few successful 
cases result in the re-employment of the worker. Compensation awards are restricted by a 
low limit to the maximum weekly pay which is used to compute the claimant's damages 
and by a statutory limit on the overall size of the award. 
Controls over redundancies fonn the other significant aspect of European dismissal 
laws. A degree of harmonisation in the area of collective redundancies and the transfer of 
employees on the sale or insolvency of a business has been brought about by the 3 
European Directives, concerning redundancy consultation (1975), employee rights in 
company transfers (1977) and employer insolvency (1980). As far as redundancy is 
concerned, the emphasis is on requiring employers to notify the employees affected and 
the state authorities in advance of their intentions. The managerial power to dismiss for 
an economically valid reason is not, as such, restricted, but in varying degrees the need to 
demonstrate a good operational reason and to conform to procedural requirements serve to 
stabilise the employment relationship and make redundancy a last resort. In West 
Germany, works councils have the right to be consulted about proposed redundancies and 
to object to the criteria laid down for the selection of redundant employees, while in 
France redundancies required the authorisation of the labour inspectorate until 1986. 
There remains a requirement to infonn and consult the enterprise committee. In Britain 
there is a duty to consult with the relevant "recognised union,.. This is increasingly 
recognised to be an ineffective requirement in a system which imposes no fonn of a duty 
to recognise or to bargain. In Italy collective redundancies are regulated by a national 
collective agreement dating from 1965. 
In addition to laws governing tennination of employment, laws providing for income 
security also play a significant part in stabilising the employment relationship. This 
category includes laws providing for the regular payment of wages and prohibiting 
unauthorised deductions; maintaining the continuity of the contract of employment during 
sickness and pregnancy, and/or providing for the payment of sick pay and maternity pay; 
providing for the payment of wages during lay-off ("guaranteed pay" in Britain, 
compensation for "partial unemployment" in some of the continental systems); and 
prohibiting unjustified changes in working conditions. In each case, state legislation is 
viewed as laying down minimum conditions which are frequently the subject of 
improvement through collective bargaining. 
The Italian system of compensation for partial unemployment is a particularly 
striking example of the use of income support legislation to stabilise the employment 
relationship. Payments from the integration fund, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
(CIG), were used during the 1980s to fund long periods of unemployment for industrial 
workers, primarily in large industrial enterprises. In this way, and coupled with the strict 
legal controls over dismissal, the CIG has effectively operated as a replacement for 
unemployment compensation which preserves the link between the firm and the worker. 
This style of regulation can be contrasted with the use of redundancy compensation in 
Britain in the 1980s to encourage firms to sever ties with their surplus labour force, a 
process which contributed to the very high levels of registered unemployment at the start 
of the 1980s. 
Anti-discrimination legislation and the protection of specific groups 
Additional protection from dismissal for trade union members and officials is an 
important mechanism for supporting the collective bargaining process at plant level. In 
Italy, the labour court will order the reinstatement of a dismisSed official at a preliminary 
hearing unless the employer produces sufficient reasons for the dismissal. In West 
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Gennany, this type of protection is applied to members and prospective members of 
works councils. 
Specific protection is also provided within dismissal law for pregnant workers. 
Italian law, for example, prohibits the dismissal of women workers during pregnancy and 
for the child's fust year unless there is serious misconduct, or the closure of the business 
in which the worker is employed. In West Gennany, there are restrictions on dismissal 
during pregnancy and the period of maternity leave. In Britain, there is a wider power to 
dismiss a pregnant worker, but this is coupled with a duty to re-employ and to pay 
maternity pay for a certain period. A number of complex procedural requirements must 
however be observed by the employee and various exceptions for small firms and fmns 
unable to re-integrate the employee after maternity leave have been introduced, leaving 
this area of the law in a particularly unsatisfactory state. 
The more general provisions of anti-discrimination law imply not just the 
establishment of a minimum "floor" for collective bargaining but also the re-structuring 
of collective agreements and other payment systems where they are a source of 
institutional or "indirect" discrimination against women workers and racial minorities. 
This trend may be observed in Bntain, where the introduction frrstly of the Equal Pay Act 
in 1970 and subsequently of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value in I 983 
prompted the revision of the more obvious fonns of direct and indirect discrimination in 
payment structures. 
The separate treatment of women in protective legislation, which dates from the 
nineteenth century, has become increasingly anachronistic with the passage of general 
equality legislation. Moves to repeal restrictions on women's nightworking have taken 
place in a number of countries, partly in response to the efforts of the European 
Commission to achieve the implementation in member states of the 1976 Directive on 
Equal Treatment in Employment. The situation of young workers is more complex, and 
here most systems retain restrictions on night work and shift work by workers under the 
age of 18 or 21 as the case may be. The principal exception is Britain, where the 
Employment Act 1989 removed all restrictions on the employment and working hours of 
young people between the ages of 18 and the school leaving age of 16 (Deakin, 1990). 
4. Derogations from labour standards: a route to labour market 
flex i b i I i t y ? 
The aim of the statutory floor of rights is to set a basic standard from which there can be 
no derogation or exception, either through collective bargaining or through individual 
agreement Wages and employment conditions below a certain level are "taken out of 
competition", a process which has potentially beneficial implications for industrial 
efficiency as well as for the control of poverty and for the general application of 
principles of equity within the wage system (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1989). At the same 
time, as we have seen, the purpose of statutory intervention is to provide a platfonn for 
collective bargaining, so that the basic tenns and conditions laid down by law can be 
improved by joint regulation. "Collective" labour laws, which include legislation for the 
recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining purposes, the imposition of a duty to 
bargain, the application and extension of collective agreements, and the preservation of a 
right to strike, arc all accordingly found to some degree within each of the European 
systems. 
Historically, there has always been a tension between these 2 fonns of regulation, 
with the need to entrench minimum standards through law being combined with a 
recognition of the value of union autonomy. The result is diversity in the relative 
importance of individual employment law and collective bargaining in tenns of the 
establishment of basic labour market rights. In Denmark, for example, where a strong 
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and highly centralised trade union movement has been able to establish general labour 
standards through various levels of collective bargaining, there is relatively little scope 
for direct floor of rights legislation. Similarly, in West Germany there is little demand 
for a statutory minimum wage as such and the introduction of such a measure might be 
seen as an infringement of the unions' role in collective bargaining and national and 
regional industry levels. Countries with a tradition of a strong centralised state and a 
high level of state intervention in the economy, such as France and Spain in their very 
different ways, illustrate a more extensive role for floor of rights legislation as well as 
providing widespread legal support for collective bargaining (Erbes-Seguin, 1989). 
Britain is an example of a system in which basic terms and conditions were left almost 
entirely to voluntary collective bargaining to achieve, with only limited state intervention 
to tackle low pay in under-organised parts of the labour market and a relatively weak and 
incomplete form of job security legislation. 
The demands of labour market flexibility constitute a different, and historically more 
recent, form of pressure upon the notion of the statutory floor of rights. From this 
perspective, the imJX>sition by law of general standards for the contract of employment is 
a source of rigidity and inefficiency in the operation of the labour market. and if not an 
initial cause of the high unemployment of the early 1980s then at least a possible barrier 
to its removal. This point of view has led to calls for greater exceptions or derogations 
to be allowed to employment protection legislation, so increasing the scope again for 
individual bargaining or at least for a greater degree of decentralisation in decision-making 
over the terms and conditions of employment. This trend, broadly speaking, takes 2 
forms (Muckenberger and Deakin, 1989): firstly, greater legal acceptance and/or 
encouragement of "atypical" or "non-standard" forms of employment relationship, that is, 
part time, fixed-term and temporary employment contracts which may in varying degrees 
provide employers with greater flexibility in the use of labour and provide exemption 
from employment protection costs; and secondly, legal authorisation for contractual 
derogations from employment protection even in the case of the "core" of permanent 
employees, sometimes through individual bargaining (increasingly the case in Britain), 
sometimes through decentralised collective bargaining at plant or enterprise level (as is 
the case in France, Italy and Germany). 
Atypical work JX>ses a problem for traditional forms of labour law and social security 
which are based to a high degree around the model of the "standard employment 
relationshipn of long-term, continuous and regular employment with a single employer. 
Not only is there a tendency for labour law rights to be restricted to workers who fall 
within the legal category of the dependent "employeen or wage-earner and who meet 
certain minimum requirements of length and continuity of service; rights accrue with 
seniority and sometimes according to status within the hierarchy of the firm. The result 
is that even otherwise regular employees with discontinuous work records and broken 
career patterns suffer from discrimination. The problem of exclusion increasingly affects 
workers in ''precarious" or casual jobs whose employment status is unclear and whose 
contractual relations with employers are irregular. This group includes homcworkers, the 
fake self-employed in sectors such as construction and services, part time workers holding 
multiple jobs and on-call workers and others who do not have a regular working week. 
Apart from this segment of highly insecure workers, other part time, lemJX>rary and fixed-
term contract workers may enjoy a high level of employment stability with a single 
employer and high job satisfaction. In their case, however, both wider employment 
opportunities and long-term income security are adversely affected by the lack of a 
"permanent" job (Btichtemann and Quack, 1989). 
Most Western European governtnents in the 1980s have seen atypical work as a 
potential means of reducing unemployment, and to that exte(lt have actively sought to 
promote more flexible working arrangements. In some countries this has been brought 
about through a tightening of qualifying conditions, as in Britain where the service 
qualification for most statutory employment rights was gradually extended from 6 months 
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to 2 years and where part time workers are excluded from labour law protection if they 
work for less than 16 hours per week (or less than 8 hours if they have 5 years 
continuous service with their employer) (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1989). As an exception 
to the usual rule by which statutory employment rights take priority over contrary terms 
in the individual contract of employment, fixed-tenn employees may agree to waive their 
rights to claim unfair dismissal and redundancy compensation upon the expiry of their 
contracts. In return the employer must offer the employee a fiXed-term of at least 1 year 
(prior to 1982 he had to offer a term of2 years). 
The emphasis, in Britain, on freedom of contract at the hiring stage meant that no 
fonnal change in the legislative structure was needed to authorise the growth of atypical 
work relationships; by contrast, in most of the continental systems a much greater 
emphasis was placed, historically, on the value of the standard employment relationship, 
with the result that new legislation was needed if employers were to be permitted to hire 
labour on a part time or temporary basis (K.ravaritou-Manitakis, 1988). Thus laws to 
extend the role of fixed-term and part time hirings were passed in West Germany (1985), 
France (1982, 1984 and 1986), Belgium (1981), Italy (1978, 1983 and 1984), Portugal 
(1984) and Spain (1984). In many cases these "deregulatory" laws were coupled with 
requirements for parity of treaunent in terms of wages and conditions of employment 
between atypical and permanent employees, a requirement which stands in stark contrast 
to the inferior protection accorded to temporary and part time workers in Britain, and for 
regulation by company level agreements of the terms on which atypical workers are hired. 
The principal example of this type of regulation is the West German Employment 
Promotion Act of 1985 (Daiibler and Le Friant, 1986). 
However, the legal situation is complicated in many cases by the continued 
application of qualifying thresholds and seniority criteria which have the effect, in 
practice, of undermining the principle of parity, particularly as regards non-wage 
payments. Nor does the principle of parity extend, in most instances, to equality within 
the social security system, where high qualifying thresholds and continuity of work 
requirements continue to be strictly applied (Kravaritou-Manitakis, 1988). 
A further means of encouraging more flexible forms of work has been for national 
governments to provide direct and indirect subsidies, through the taxation system, to 
employers taking on unemployed workers on a part time or fixed-term contract basis 
(Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989). In Britain subsidies have been paid directly to employers 
taking on the young unemployed for training and work experience in a variety of 
schemes. An additional technique has been to pay the adult unemployed a small weekly 
supplement on top of their benefit in return for attending work experience and training 
COW"SeS. 
Subsidies for the employment of young people on fixed-term contracts also operate 
1n France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium. In most cases these operate through 
rebates on social security contributions. In France and Italy the state has encouraged job 
creation by offering subsidies for the formation of "solidarity contracts" between 
employers and unions at plant or company level, whereby state subsidies are made 
available in return for agreement on reductions in working time and the employment of 
unemployed workers usually on a fixed-tenn contract basis (Wedderburn and Sciarra, 
1988). In Spain, the legislation of 1984 created no fewer than 15 types of temporary 
work contract covering separate justifications for the departure from a permanent job 
offer, and involving varying levels of state subsidy through the social security system. 
The result has been a substantial increase in the proportion of fixed-tenn contract workers 
to between a quarter and a third of all employees, with an estimated 90-95 percent of new 
hirings in the private sector taking the fonn of a temporary contract (Recio, 1990). 
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Table 4: Part time and temporary employment in the European Community, 1983-1988 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Grecre 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
West Germany 
UK 
Community 
Part timea 
1983 
% 
8.3 
25.6 
8.9 
4.9 
5.8 
3.5 
6.2 
20.9 
12.0 
19.4 
1988 
% 
11.0 
25.5 
12.0 
4.0 
8.2 
5.0 
6.7 
29.4 
4.5 
4.7 
12.7 
22.8 
13.6 
Source: European Commission ( 1990). 
Notes: a Part time employees as a proportion of all employees. 
b Temporary employees as a proportion of all employees. 
Temporaryb 
1983 
% 
4.1 
12.7 
(1985) 
3.2 
3.1 
4.9 
1.8 
3.8 
11.1 
(1984) 
3.1 
1988 
% 
5.4 
11.1 
7.8 
17.6 
9.1 
5.8 
3.7 
8.7 
18.5 
22.3 
11.2 
5.9 
9.6 
The extent and composition of atypical working varies greatly from one country to 
another (European Commission, 1990). As Table 4 shows, levels of part time working 
are highest in the Netherlands (which approaches 30 percent of the employed population), 
Denmark and the UK (each between 20 and 25 percent). Sweden also has a high 
proportion of part time workers, around 25 percent of the employed labour force. Part 
time work appears to be relatively insignificant, on the other hand, in Spain, Portugal, 
Italy and Greece. Temporary employment, however, is high i.n Spain (over 20 percent), 
Portugal and Greece (each between 15 and 20 percent). Most striking, however, is the 
rate of growth of atypical work in the 1980s: part time work increased by 28 percent but 
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full-time employment by only 2.4 percent in the 10 member states of the EEC between 
1983 and 1988.4 
As we have already seen, these figures cannot be equated in any sense with numbers 
of workers excluded from labour law protection. Most part time workers with hours 
above the statutory thresholds will enjoy protection at least fonnally equivalent to that of 
full timers. Nevertheless, the growth not just of atypical work as a whole but of a large 
segment of part time and temporary workers who are excluded from basic labour law and 
social security protection, and of groups for whom a lower level of job security and 
employment opportunities apply, is a matter of concern. It should also be borne in mind 
that the groups tending to fill atypical jobs are those most vulnerable to labour market 
discrimination - married women returning to the labour market after looking after 
families, young workers entering the market for the frrst time and the displaced adult male 
unemployed who are trying to fmd a new "permanent" job (Rodgers, 1989). 
Attempts to achieve greater labour market flexibility through changes in the law are 
not confined to the issue of atypical work. Increasingly, national governments have 
attempted to introduce a greater number of derogations from labour and employment 
protection standards, and to encourage the decentralisation of collective bargaining from 
sector to company or establishment level, so giving employers more extensive freedom 
to vary working patterns and wage payment systems. 
In Britain, the Wages Act 1986 removed young workers, below the age of 21, 
altogether from the scope of statutory wages orders, and restricted the powers of the 
remaining Wages Councils to seuing a single hourly minimum rate and overtime rate for 
their sectors. Previously they had set minimum rates for all grades of workers in the 
manner of sector level collective agreements. The British government's programme of 
privatising and contracting-out public sector services has also led to a de facto reduction 
in the scope of coverage of collective agreements, as subcontractors have withdrawn 
recognition from previously established unions and undercut sector level agreements 
which, in the absence of extension legislation, cannot be made to apply on a general 
basis. Even wilhin areas of strong trade union organisation, the effectiveness of sector-
level agreements as a form of labour market regulation has been steadily reduced. This is 
partly due to changes in trade union legislation which make the organisation of industrial 
action on a sectoral basis and the exercise of economic pressure at labour-market level 
both potentially unlawful. 
With the downgrading in Britain of collective bargaining and employment protection 
standards, there is a trend towards the "individualisation" of terms and conditions of 
employment. In some sectors where contracting-out has become common, what is 
sometimes called individualisation is simply another way of describing the consequences 
of the de-recognition of unions and the disapplication of collective agreements. As far as 
directly-employed, "core" workers are concerned, legislation has encouraged the growth of 
personal pay incentives by providing tax subsidies for fmns operating systems of profit-
related pay and employee share ownership plans. So far these measures have had a 
limited impact, however. The range of payment systems in both manufacturing and 
service sectors is highly diverse and forms of performance-related pay have been used for 
many years. The relative lack of detailed legal regulation of wages and payment systems 
has meant that British employers have long enjoyed a high level of flexibility in this 
regard 
Significant changes to working time legislation, aimed at introducing greater 
flexibility in working schedules, have taken place in France, Italy and Belgium, but in 
each case a role for collccti vc bargaining as a mechanism for controlling and monitoring 
derogations from labour standards has been preserved. In France, for example, the 
establishment of the 39 hour week in 1982 was made conditional upon implementation 
by agreement at plant and company level, through which provision could be made for 
4 This calculation excludes Spain and Portugal who joined the Community from 1 Q86. 
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increased working of 2 or 3 hours a week as long as a 39 hour average was maintained 
over an 8 or 12 week period, and further legislation in 1987 envisages company level 
agreement on flexible annual working hours, Sunday working and women's nightwork 
(Erbes-Seguin, 1989). Similar reforms have also been proposed for West Germany 
(MUckenbergcr and Deakin, 1989). A Bill presented to the Federal Parliament would 
allow working hours to increase from 8 to 10 hours per day as long as the 8 hour average 
was maintained over a 4 month period, with provision for further derogations to be 
authorised by collective bargaining. Libcralisation of restrictions on Sunday working and 
on the working week of women employees arc also part of the proposal. 
Belgian legislation of 1983 allowed companies to derogate from a range of legal 
controls on the working day and week and restraints on weekend working, on condition 
that the new arrangements met with the approval of the trade unions, through the 
collective bargaining process, and of the Ministry of Labour. A further condition was 
that the new arrangements had to involve the hiring of extra employees. Following the 
legislation, a number of flexibility agreements were drawn up, involving increased 
weekend and variable shift working. In 1986 a national collective agreement made further 
provision for the introduction of flexible working time arrangements, and in 1987 the 
main provisions of this agreement were incorporated into legislation. It is now possible 
for company-based agreements to move towards totally flexible annual hours as long as 
the 39 hour weekly average is maintained on a yearly basis. 
These developments suggest that collective bargaining at company or plant level will 
increasingly be used as a means of achieving flexibility in the application of labour 
standards, a process which maintains an active role both for the floor of rights and for 
joint regulation (Wedderburn and Sciarra, 1988). This technique may be contrasted with 
the tendency in Britain for both statutory rights and collective bargaining to be 
downgraded, rcsul ting in a reduced coverage of general labour standards and an increasing 
trend towards individualisation and insecurity for employees in the non-unionised 
workforce (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1989). 
5. Conclusion 
At a time of deregulation and growing international competition and economic 
integration within Europe, the future for the floor of rights is uncertain. In some areas 
there has been an erosion of minimum legal standards governing terms and conditions of 
employment, as governments have sought to encourage greater flexi ility in the usc and 
deployment of labour by fmns. However, with the exception of Britain, the demand for 
greater flexibility in the application of standards has not led to a wholesale dismantling of 
the floor of rights. In most systems collective bargaining continues to play a significant, 
and in some ways an increasingly important, role in regulating terms and conditions of 
employment. This role for collective bargaining derives from the importance of plant and 
company level agreements in achieving greater flexibility of working time and contractual 
arrangements, within a more general framework of security set by minimum legal 
standards and a continuing commitment of governments to the principle of joint 
regulation in industry. 
The continuing emphasis on a viable role for collective bargaining and employment 
protection in the continental systems is partly a product of the much closer relationship 
which existed, historically, between the forms of collective bargaining and the law 
regulating the contract of employment. Rather than seeking a return to the individual 
contract of employment, legislative reform in the 1980s has sought to re-define the 
relationship between collective labour law and the individual\ contract of employment 
through the techniques of controlled derogations which were examined above. In Britain, 
on the other hand, the long tradition of legal voluntarism which gave priority to 
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collective bargaining over direct legal regulation meant that only a weak and partial floor 
of rights could develop. Deregulation in Britain has seen both a withdrawal of 
employment protection for "marginaln groups and widespread state intervention in 
industrial relations procedures aimed at limiting the social and economic power of the 
trade unions. What we observe, therefore~ is not a withdrawal of the state to leave a 
''freed-up" labour market, but rather a range of legal responses in different countries, 
which in many areas have modified and indeed extended the role of the state in labour 
market regulation. 
Much of the justification for deregulation in the areas of atypical work and working 
time flexibility is the need to re-integrate the unemployed into the labour market. 
However, the flexibility debate has tended up to now to address only one side of the 
problem, namely employers' needs for a more flexible legal framework for the adjustment 
of labour costs and inputs. Less attention has been paid to the use of the law to promote 
flexibility on the supply side of the labour market, by providing active incentives for 
individuals to adopt a greater variety of working patterns and by encouraging 
disadvantaged groups to enter or re-enter the labour market. Indeed, the aims of greater 
supply side flexibility are likely to be frustrated by a policy of wholesale deregulation. 
There is a growing recognition that deregulation itself can be a source of undesirable 
"rigidities" on both the demand and supply sides of the labour market (Streeck, 1988). 
It is doubtful, for example, whether the removal of employment protection rights 
from existing job holders will have a beneficial impact on unemployment~ or increase the 
employment opportunities of workers who currently have access only to atypical jobs. 
The more likely outcome, at least on the basis of the experience in Britain up to now, is 
a growing casualisation of work and a downgrading of job quality, together with increased 
discrimination against vulnerable labour market groups (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1989). 
Cuts in social and employment protection of the kind which have taken place in Britain 
over the past decade make worker mobility and external flexibility less and not more 
likely as they have a disproportionate impact upon the income security of the 
unemployed, the low paid and others who do not have regular access to stable 
employment. From this point of view, a high level of social protection in labour law 
and social security may have beneficial effects in terms of labour market participation 
rates and the re-integration of the unemployed into the labour force (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1989). 
The growth of atypical employment in the 1980s poses a number of problems for 
the traditional forms of the floor of rights. Policies promoting atypical work may resulL 
in increasing division and segmentation of the labour market as a whole. There is a need 
for labour law and social security to accommodate a greater variety of contractual forms of 
employmen t and lo ensure that the atypical forms do not just become dead-end or 
expendable jobs. The alternative is a growing dualism within the labour market, between 
existing job-holders on the one hand and new entrants (young workers, migrant workers) 
and those attempting to re-enter after a period out of regular waged employment (married 
women and displaced workers) on the other, who are pushed into insecure and short-tenn 
jobs or jobs with no regular career structure. It is not clear that any lasting progress has 
been made if, in an attempt to narrow the gap between the unemployed and those in 
regular work, a dualist labour law policy creates new barriers to mobility between those 
in atypical work, on the one handl and those with a nstandard" employment relationship 
on the other. Unless governments take positive measures to improve the protection 
offered to atypical workers and to provide more effective rights at the level of the labour 
market, so-called flexible working arrangements will continue to be more a matter of 
necessi ty rather than choice for vulnerable labour market groups and something to be 
avoided for "core" workers. 
There is therefore a role for new forms of labour and social security law which can 
provide a framework of security beyond the immediate employment relationship, so 
encouraging greater mobility within the labour market and providing substance to the idea 
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of individuals' rights to a ~~choice of occupation". Laws promoting the integration of 
atypical workers into existing systems of protection and establishing principles of equal 
treaunent between groups in the labour market are an example of this form of "re-
regulation". It will be necessary to pay greater attention than before to the role of anti-
discrimination legislation and social security law as forms of labour market rights, and to 
their relationship to the floor of rights within the contract of employment (M tickenberger 
and Deakin, 1989). 
There does not seem to be any immediate prospect of the introduction of fully 
effective harmonisation of social and labour laws at EC level (Mosley, 1990). 
Nevertheless, there is acceptance of the role to be played by a basic floor of rights in 
imposing a "level playing field" in the single market (European Commission, 1990). It 
remains to be seen whether the debate about a "social area" within an integrated European 
economy has sufficiently revitalised the development of social and labour standards for 
viable alternatives to deregulation to be advanced and implemented. 
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